Abstract
Introduction
In both military and civilian contexts, fault-tolerance -a guarantee to provide a specified quality of service in the presence of faults -is one of the important requirements of safety-critical systems. Because new technology and new threats can cause a system's fault-tolerance requirements to change, a system may need to satisfy new fault-tolerance requirements. Verifying that a system correctly implements new fault-tolerance requirements is usually very difficult. Hence, tools are needed that allow users to add fault-tolerance to systems as automatically as possible. To be the most effective, the learning curve for such tools should be small, i.e., the addition and verification of fault-tolerance should be performed as transparently as possible. Ideally, the tool should allow the designer to add fault-tolerance using a user-friendly interface that is part of the current toolset with which they are familiar.
With this motivation, we focus on automated addition of fault-tolerance to the SCR (Software Cost Reduction) toolset [1] . SCR is a set of formal methods for constructing and verifying requirements specification documents. The U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) developed SCR in the late 70s. Since then it has been used in constructing many critical mission systems. SCR was used to design and model A-7 aircraft and to document requirements of many other systems such as OFP for A-6 aircraft, the Bell telephone, submarines communication systems and nuclear plants. SCR specifies system requirements using tabular notion in a precise and compact way, making it possible for the user to automatically model and analyze the requirements document to identify errors.
We envision two ways to automate the addition of fault-tolerance to SCR. One way is to build a tool that directly reads a fault-intolerant SCR specification to generate a fault-tolerant SCR specification. Another approach is to combine SCR with a tool that automates the addition of fault-tolerance. The latter approach is preferred, as it allows one to perform separation of concerns where the fault-tolerance aspect is relegated only to the tool that performs the automated addition of fault-tolerance. Moreover, the latter approach also has the potential to provide reuse while adding fault-tolerance to other toolsets, such as RSML [2] and STATEMATE [3] , that are useful in other domains. In addition, with the latter approach, any improvement to the toolset for automated addition of fault-tolerance would automatically improve the automation of fault-tolerance to all toolsets with which it is combined. Of course, with the latter approach, it would be necessary to convert (1) the faultintolerant SCR specification into a format that can be used with the tool for adding fault-tolerance and (2) the synthesized fault-tolerant program into corresponding SCR specification.
Based on the above discussion, in this paper, we combine SCR with the fault-tolerance tool FTSyn [4] . To deal with the complexity of synthesis, FTSyn, uses heuristic-based approaches to automatically add faulttolerance to programs. To interact with FTSyn the fault intolerant program should be specified in guarded command format. FTSyn then generates the fault-tolerant program, which is also in guarded command format. Recently, this tool has been extended to handle symbolic techniques [5] that can allow us to handle large state space. In particular, in [5] authors have shown that state space of 2 100 can be efficiently used in syntheses.
Contributions:
The main contributions of the paper are as follows:
• We present a tool that combines SCR tools and FTSyn. With this tool, the output of the SCR tools is imported into the FTSyn in order to automatically add fault-tolerance specification. The output of FTSyn is then exported back to the SCR tools to obtain the fault-tolerant SCR specification.
• We illustrate our tool using two different eventdriven applications: the aircraft Altitude Switch Controller and the automobile Cruse Control System. In both of those systems, we used our tool to transfer requirements specifications described in SCR to programs in FTSyn. Then, after FTSyn had added the fault-tolerance to specifications, the tool translated the specifications back so that they could be visualized in SCR. Organization: The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we discuss the background of this work. It gives a brief description of the formal SCR methods; it also provides highlights of SCR tools. We also give a brief overview of FTSyn. In Section 3, we describe the approach used in transforming the SCR to guarded commands. Section 4 presents the two case studies. We describe related work in Section 5. Finally, we discuss future and present our conclusion in Section 5.
Background
In this section, we describe how the SCR toolset is used to describe event-driven systems. Subsequently, we give a brief overview of FTSyn.
SCR Formal Model
The SCR method describes requirements using tables that are easy to understand [6, 7] . The constructs of SCR are based on Paranas's [8] m represent a change in the value of the monitored variables, and T is the function that identifies transitions of the system based on monitored events [2] .
The SCR tools are composed of a specification editor, a user interface for creating, editing, and verifying the tabular specification, a dependency graph browser between variables, and a Simulator, which tests if the desired system behavior is satisfied. The SCR tools also include a consistency checker, a model checker, and a property checker.
Automatic Addition of Fault-Tolerance
Programs are subject to faults that may not be preventable. A program may function correctly in the absence of faults. However, it may not give the desired functionality when faults occur. The automatic addition of fault-tolerance is the process of the automatic transformation of a fault-intolerant program to a faulttolerant one. This transformation guarantees that the program continues to satisfy the desired specification in the presence of faults. FTSyn is a framework for adding such automated fault-tolerance [4] . In FTSyn, programs (input and output) and faults are represented using guarded commands. FTSyn [4] takes both the program and the faults as an input and generates the fault-tolerant program version as an output.
To add fault-tolerance, FTSyn first identifies states from where faults alone can violate safety specification. It removes such states and transitions that reach them. Then, it adds recovery transitions to ensure that after the occurrence of faults, the program recovers to its legitimate states that are specified by its invariant. FTSyn also enables synthesis of distributed programs by allowing modeling of read/write restrictions of variables and ensuring that these restrictions are met in the synthesized program.
Integration of SCR and FTSyn
In this section, we first describe how we translate the SCR program into an input for FTSyn. Then, we describe modeling of faults and subsequently give an outline of our tool for automating addition of fault-tolerance to SCR.
Transforming SCR specifications into FTSyn input
The integration of SCR and FTSyn mainly focuses on the mode table since the mode table captures the system behavior in response to different inputs. Hence, mode table is the most relevant in terms of the effect of the faults on system behavior. The integration focuses on translating the mode table so that it can be used as an input in FTSyn and then translating the FTSyn output so as to generate the mode table of the fault-tolerant SCR specification.
We illustrate the mode table in SCR using a simple example (cf. To add fault-tolerance to the SCR specification, we need to convert the SCR tables into guarded commands. In particular, we need to translate modes, conditions, terms, and events. Next, we describe how we translate the SCR events into guarded commands for FTSyn. Events in SCR occur at the time when the value of their condition is switched from false to true or vice versa in a single transition. It is not only the current state of the monitored variable that initiates the transition; rather, it is the combination of both the current and the old states. The notation used to represent events is as follows:
where(c) represents the condition value in the before state and ( c′ ) represent the condition value in the after state [2] . For example, if we consider the SCR mode table entry in mRoom:
From "Dark" EVENT"@T (mSwtichOn)" TO Light"
In the "before" state, the mode value mRoom is Dark and the condition mSwitchOn is False. And, in the "after" state the mode value mRoom = Light and the condition mSwitchOn = True.b In FTSyn, (guarded commands) transitions are represented in the following format:
(g st ) The guard, g, is a predicate whose value must be true in the before state in order for the statement, st, to execute. The guarded command translation for mRoom table entry would be:
(mRoom == Dark) && (MSwtichOn == False) mRoom= Light; mSwtich = True Likewise, we need to convert states, terms, and modes into the corresponding input for FTSyn. In particular, each mode is translated into corresponding states that a program could reach. Conditions are translated into guards that determine when actions can be executed.
Modeling of faults
Faults in FTSyn are also modeled using guarded commands that change program variables. To effectively model faults for designers, we can model them using tables similar to the way the SCR specification is specified. Note that this would require changes to the SCR toolset. However, the change is minimal in that it would require adding a extra table for faults rather than putting all program/fault actions together as was done in [1] . Note that with this change, we do not expect the designer task to be more complex since faults are specified using a method similar to describing programs. For simplicity, currently, we let faults be directly represented using guarded commands so that modification to the SCR toolset is not necessary. Likewise, it would be necessary for the designer to specify requirements in the presence of faults (for example, an invariant where the program should recover to). These specifications are also similar to that used in SCR for requirements in the absence of faults.
Adding fault-tolerance to SCR specifications
The scenario of adding fault-tolerance to the SCR specifications is described in Figure 1 . The cycle begins at 1 by creating the specifications requirement using the SCR tools. The specifications in SCR formats are exported from the SCR tool set as in step 2. In step 3, the middle-layer imports the SCR specifications and the first translation phase generates an output file for the use in the addition of fault-tolerance by FTSyn. This file is imported in step 4 to FTSyn. FTSyn generates a faulttolerant version of the program in step 5. In step 6, the middle-layer imports the FTSyn output and translates it back to the SCR specification. Finally, in step 8, the file is imported back into the SCR tool set so that it can be visualized using the SCR tools.
Thus, the translation layer shown in Figure 1 allows the automated addition of fault-tolerance where the addition is done under the hood. Therefore, it allows users of the SCR tools to add fault-tolerance to specifications without knowing the details of FTSyn or the theory on which FTSyn is based. 
Case Studies
To illustrate the integration of SCR and FTSyn, we present two case studies: the control system for an aircraft Altitude Switch and the automobile Cruise Control System. For both systems, we briefly describe the concept and demonstrate how our 8-step method from Section 3.3 works on these examples to translate the fault-intolerant SCR specification into the corresponding fault-tolerant specification.
Case Study 1: Altitude Switch Controller
The mRoom Mode The mReset monitors the reset. Below, we show how the fault-tolerant altitude switch controller is synthesized using the tool described in Figure 1 .
Step 1: As shown in Figure 1 at step 1, we extract the mode table of ASW system in SCR specification. The mcStatus mode table of the ASW system is illustrated in Figure 3 . It describes mode class mcStatus that represents a function between the monitored variables and the current value of the mcStatus. The mcStatus class has one of the following three modes: standby, init, or awaitDOIon. For example, the first entry in the table shows that if the mInitializing becomes false and the mcStatus is equal to init then the new value of the mcStatus = standby. 
Fault intolerant mode class mcStatus

Figure 3. Mode Transition Table for mcStatus
Step 2&3: At step 2, we import the SCR specification into the middle layer. This layer generates the input in guarded command format at step 3. The result of the translation layer is as shown in Figure 4 . The first entry in Figure 4 shows that the old value of the mcStatus should be equal to standby, and mReset is False in the "before" state in order to execute the corresponding statement. The two statements in the right hand side represent the "after" state; both values of mcStatus and mReset should be changed. 
Figure 4. The mcStatus mode table translated
We consider three hardware malfunctions that may alter the operation of the fault intolerant ASW controller [1] . They are an altimeter fault, an initialization fault, and DOI fault. All three faults are time-out faults, i.e., they require the system to stay in a given state for a specified amount of time. But since FTSyn does not include the notion of time yet, we abstract those faults to be a on/off flags. We added a new mode, fault, to the mode class to indicate the presence of faults in the system. Figure 5 shows how those faults are represented in the input file to FTSyn. Note that the fault transitions described below can be easily described using SCR tables so that the designer can specify them using an interface that they are familiar with. Step 4: In step 4, we use the translated SCR specification and the three faults described in Figure 5 as an input to FTSyn so that FTSyn can add fault-tolerance to ASW specification that will tolerate the failure of the altimeter, initialization or DOI.
Step 5: The result of step 5 is shown in Figure 6 . The parts where FTSyn have add the tolerance were at two places. First, the condition (mAltFail == False) was added to the guard of the third transition to prevent the mcStatus from activating the device when mAltFail is true. Second, the last transition was added to lead to recovery from the fault state to one of the system safe states.
Step 6 & 7: We import the FTSyn specifications into the translation layer at step 6 to translate it to faulttolerant SCR specifications. Figure 7 is the result after applying the translation on the mcStatus from FTSyn output to SCR. Step 8: In step 8, we import back into SCR tools the fault-tolerant SCR specifications. The fault-tolerant specifications are as shown in Figure 7 . 
Fault-tolerant mode class mcStatus
Case Study 2: Cruise Control System
The cruise control system (CCS) controls the cruising speed of an automobile by controlling the throttle position. It depends on several monitored variables like mIgnon, mEngRunning, mSpeed, mLever, and mBrake. The system uses monitored variables values to control the automobile speed. It can be engaged by setting the const switch to "on", provided that other conditions like engine running and ignition is on are met. The CCS can maintain constant, decrease, or increase automobile speed depending on the current speed. Below, we show how fault-tolerant CCS is synthesized using the tool described in Figure 1 . The mCruise mode table is shown in Figure 8 . The table specifies the values that the mCruise class can take. We imported the mode table in Figure 8 into the middle layer, which generated specification in FTSyn format. Then we translated the mCruise mode table to FTSyn. Figure 8 . Fault intolerant mode class mcCruise.
Fault intolerant mode class mcCruise
We consider a system malfunction that may alter the operation of the fault intolerant CCS. The fault takes place when the status of the cruise becomes unknown. Figure 9 shows how this fault is represented in the input file to FTSyn. We have inputted the faults and the fault intolerant CCS to FTSyn in order to add fault-tolerance to the CCS system to tolerate a recover from "unknown" state to one of the CCS safe state. FTSyn added two actions to recover from the unknown state to one of the system valid states depending on the value of the IgnOn monitored variable. The fault-tolerant specification is as shown in Figure 10 . 
Fault-tolerant mode class mcCruise
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we focused on automated addition of faulttolerance to the SCR toolset. As discussed in the introduction, instead of trying to add fault-tolerance from scratch, we focused on combining the SCR toolset with FTSyn that is designed for automated addition of faulttolerance to distributed programs. Towards this end, we developed a middle layer that converted the faultintolerant SCR specification into an input for FTSyn and then converted the FTSyn output into the corresponding fault-tolerant SCR specification. The middle layer allowed us to hide most aspects of the addition of faulttolerance thereby allowing the addition of fault-tolerance to be done under-the-hood. We expect that the ability to add fault-tolerance underthe-hood is especially useful, as it allows the designer to use the interface they were already using. This reduces the learning curve. In the context of SCR, this is especially useful since the SCR toolset has already been adopted by the industry and is used in the development of many real world applications. Furthermore, the SCR toolset integrates several tools for consistency checking, verification etc. Since synthesized fault-tolerant SCR specification can be viewed/modified using the SCR toolset, one can analyze the synthesized fault-tolerant SCR specification for various other properties using existing tools.
The case studies also showed that, to be effective, certain changes need to be made to the interface (SCR toolset). In particular, they demonstrated that the SCR toolset would have to be modified to include description of faults. However, we showed the changes required for this are simple and that it does not change the basic approach (designing tables) that the designers use. In particular, the faults themselves could be represented using tables that were similar to those used in (both faultintolerant and fault-tolerant) SCR specification. It also demonstrated that the designer would also need to specify requirements that should be met in the presence of faults. Once again, this is similar to how other requirements (not related to fault-tolerance) are specified in SCR toolset. These changes to the SCR toolset are reasonable in that they essentially require the designer to specify what the faults are and the requirements for fault-tolerance in the presence of faults. By using FTSyn, the designer is able to synthesize a program that meets those specifications as well as specifications in the absence of faults.
Automated synthesis with FTSyn also provides the possibility of detecting errors in requirements themselves. In particular, in our work on Altitude Switch Controller, the first program we synthesized, allowed several recovery paths to be added, e.g., to states such as awaitDOIon. This was caused due to a missing requirement on how recovery can be added. Since FTSyn tries to provide maximum non-determinism in the synthesized program, if a requirement is missing then there is a high potential that it would be detected in the synthesized program. Since it is desirable that the missing requirements and errors in fault-tolerance specifications should be detected early in the design stage, this approach also provides the ability to reduce cost by early error detection. Moreover, since SCR toolset allows one to simulate the synthesized program, such errors could be detected with testing tools that are integrated with SCR.
We are currently working on extending this work for other parts of SCR specifications (other than modes). We are also investigating the possibility of integrating FTSyn to other tools such as RSML and STATEMATE. Finally, we are also working towards developing patterns so that the designer can specify the faults and requirements in the presence of faults easily using those patterns.
